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British foreign policy examined Hungary’s role with respect to its effect on the European power-
balance: it judged Hungary favourably as long as it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy, but, as Hungarian separatist ambitions grew stronger, the country was treated as a threat 
The paper looks at how the members of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference saw 
differently the way through which the maintenance of the above mentioned power balance could 
have been reached. Moreover, it is also scrutinised how various interest groups could exercise 
considerable impact on the outcome of the negotiations. On the one hand, Arthur Balfour, head of 
the British Foreign Office, thought that a long-term peace was possible only by strengthening the 
new, winner nation states, whose tasks were to hinder further German expansion towards the 
Balkans, and Bolshevism towards Europe. On the other hand, David Lloyd George, head of the 
British Cabinet, was on the opinion that only the extension of the Wilsonian Principles on the 
loser states could bring enduring peace in Europe. This study also investigates to what extent 
utilizing the nationalist movements proved to be effective tactics for the Entente Powers in 
reaching their war aims. Namely, the Entente proclaimed independence for the nationalities and 
a just settlement, but at the same time, they tried to comply with the secret covenants concluded 
during the war. These secret agreements did not take nationalist interests into consideration at 
all, and they meant specifically unjust arrangement to Hungary. Consequently, the paper argues 
that the Trianon Treaty was not only the result of political instability in Hungary and the Car-
pathian Basin in general as well as the validation of the Great Powers’ political interests on the 
continent, which proposed to impede German expansion and Russian Bolshevism, but also the 
result of the more effective propaganda activity of the anti-Hungarian group of British political 
activists and their international network led by Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson. 
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Introduction 
 
The First World War and the peace treaties occupy a prominent place in to-
day’s public and scholarly discourse. It is especially true for Hungary and its 
neighbours at the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon. This paper looks 
at British perspectives on the development of the Hungarian post-war settle-
ment and the Treaty of Trianon by analysing contemporary primary sources, 
including press publications, general works on diplomacy, political speeches 
and memoires, to better understand not only the changes in the political dis-
course but also the motivations of the historical figures concerned. The article 
is designed to study their influence on the Paris Peace Conference and the post-
war settlement with regard to Hungary as well as the trajectory of these opin-
ions and policies with respect to Hungary. It is argued that the Trianon Treaty 
was not only the result of political instability in Hungary and the Carpathian 
Basin in general as well as the validation of the Great Powers’ political interests 
on the continent, which proposed to impede German expansionism and Rus-
sian Bolshevism, but also the result of the more effective propaganda activity 
of the anti-Hungarian group of British political activists and their international 
network led by Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson. 
Before and during the First World War anti-Hungarian and pro-Slav voices 
became dominant and the pro-Hungarian politicians and intellectuals could 
not make their standpoints accepted as successfully as the pro-Slav activists. 
The most important reason for this was that the pro-Slav French and British 
activists built a closely-knit international network to downplay and eventually 
disintegrate the originally pro-Monarchist bias, especially in Britain.1 French 
political and public figures showed the least pro-Hungarian attitudes; almost 
all of the French politicians, activists represented a pro-Slav and anti-Austro-
Hungarian standpoint. It is worth noting that the integrity of the Monarchy 
played an important role in British and French policy (at least in a federalised 
or a trialist form) until it met their interests as great powers (using Austria-
Hungary to balance German expansionism, stabilising the East-Central Euro-
pean region, etc.). However, when they realised that the Slav nationalist 
groups, fighting for their own nationalist aims, could better serve their inter-
ests as great powers, most of them realigned their strategies and rhetoric in 
relation to the Monarchy.2 In 1916 Robert Seton-Watson, one of the main pro-
Slav protagonists, published his work, German, Slav and Magyar, in which he 
disseminated his ideas about the “ethnic tyranny” of the Hungarians that be-
came a commonplace in later discussions on pre-war Hungary.3 
 
1  CORA 2019, 7–32.; I am indebted to one of my former MA Thesis writers, Erik Papp, 
who wrote as well as published an excellent MA Thesis on the topic: British and 
French Political Approaches to Hungary at the Turn of the 19th–20th Century. Sze-
ged, 2018. The published version of his thesis is Papp 2019. 
2  CORA 2019, 19–31. 
3 “To-say it is no longer possible or necessary to argue about the exact strength of Pan-
Germanism on the eve of war. For in war moderate counsels are necessarily thrust 
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The pro-Slav British and French lobby groups had similar views on the fu-
ture of Hungary. These groups mutually monitored and reflected on the activi-
ty of one another, so many of them, who participated in the delegations or 
were trusted advisors, arrived at the peace conference with quite complex yet 
clearly informed opinions about the desired post-war settlement that they 
wanted to realise as chief advisors of their respective leading politicians.4 
British politicians traditionally regarded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
as one of the pillars of European stability. However, the political crisis in 1905–
1906 clearly showed the deficiencies of the Monarchy’s political system, as a 
result of which such political activists as Seton-Watson or Wickham Steed be-
gan to search for alternatives that could replace the Habsburg-dynasty in 
providing stability in East-Central Europe. Nevertheless, the dissolution of the 
Monarchy was not an option for them prior to the war; they rather wished to 
see the political reforms, especially democratisation, of the Monarchy, with the 
Slav nations invested with political autonomy.5 
At the time of the outbreak of the Great War, Steed and Seton-Watson radi-
calised, and in order to support the endeavours of the Slav nations, they start-
ed to forge evidence and to consciously misinterpret political and social devel-
opments. For example, when the political elite of Hungary used cruel methods 
to quench potential rebellions, it was represented by Steed and Seton-Watson 
 
into the background on every side; and to-day Germany is writing the Pan-
German programme in letters of blood on the face of Europe. Her alliance with 
Austria-Hungary has become more indissoluble than ever, and the idea of a cus-
toms-union as a final seal upon the bond is being propagated by prominent politi-
cians, publicists, professors, and bankers…To-day we are faced by a solid mid-
European bloc of 120 millions, which can only be shattered or pared down by mili-
tary effort, but cannot be split up by diplomacy…Unless we are prepared to desert 
our Allies and conclude an ignominious peace with Germany, we must counter 
the German plan of “Mitteleuropa” and “Berlin-Bagdad” by placing obstacles in 
its path. In one of its main aspects this war is the decisive struggle of Slav and 
German, and upon it depends the final settlement of the Balkan and Austrian 
problems […] Germany can only be defeated if we are prepared to back the Slavs 
and liberate the Slav democracies of Central Europe […] The essential preliminar-
ies then, are the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the disruption of the 
Habsburg Monarchy into its component parts. On its ruins new and vigorous na-
tional states will arise. The great historic memories of the past will be restored to 
the Commonwealth of Nations, and in their new form will constitute a chain of 
firm obstacles on the path of German aggression. (I) Poland, freed from its long 
bondage […] (2) Bohemia, who has been the vanguard of the struggle against 
Germanization for eight centuries […] (3) The small and landlocked Serbia of the 
past will be transformed into a strong and united Southern Slav State […] (4) in-
dependent Hungary, stripped of its oppressed nationalities and reduced to its true 
Magyar kernel […] emancipated from the corrupt oligarchy […]; and (5) Greater 
Roumania, consisting of the present kingdom, augmented by the Roumanian dis-
tricts of Hungary, Bukovina, and Bessarabia.” SETON-WATSON 1916, 171–174. 
4  For the antecedents of this in detail, see: JESZENSZKY 1994. 
5  ARDAY 2009, 8.; STEINER 1969, 70–82.; JESZENSZKY 1994, 80–96.; PÉTER 2012, 439–446. 
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as the method of viciously suppressing the nationalities.6 Or, when the elec-
toral system introduced to preserve the integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom 
was shown to be a system that suppressed the votes on the basis of the voters’ 
national belonging.7 
However, Steed and Seton-Watson had some opponents who supported the 
Hungarian viewpoint: Arthur B. Yolland was a pro-Hungarian intellectual and 
political actor who gained Hungarian citizenship, learned Hungarian and 
taught at Hungarian universities.8 Yolland was among the few British who 
truly supported the Hungarian cause and called attention to the web of distor-
tions propagandists tried to cast.9 James Bryce, the famous British traveller, 
was not a rabid pro-Hungarian propagandist, but in his itineraries and travel 
books he depicted a rather peaceful image of everyday people’s lives.10 For 
example, according to Bryce, the Slovaks and the Hungarians lived together 
harmoniously, and neither the Slovaks, nor the Hungarians wanted to assimi-
late to the other.11 This statement is contrary to what Seton-Watson claimed in 
 
6  BERETZKY 2005, 19–20. 
7  SCOTUS VIATOR 1908, 392. 
8  JESZENSZKY 1994, 90–95.; FRANK 2018, 99–113.; For further, pro-Hungarian British 
actors, see: CORA 2019, 14–19. 
9  “Living far away from my native land, I have learned to love and admire Hunga-
ry, her people, her culture, her literature. The latter is the work of a great and no-
ble race, which, despite the oppressions to which it has been subjected, despite the 
centuries of desperate struggle against the inroads of the devastating Turks, who 
might, for the generous self-sacrifice of the Magyars and their brilliant leaders, 
have overrun Europe, have produced a literature of which any civilised nation 
might well be proud.[…] I shall be able to render services far more valuable and 
lasting than could be done by scores of pamphlets or historical studies. Hungary 
and the Hungarians have, during the past, been but little known; the many dis-
torted and ill-meaning reports spread about the country and its inhabitants cannot 
be better answered than by a study of literature. The many-headed dragon of mal-
ice and calumny cannot be more effectively combatted than by an insight into the 
character and thought of the people which has been so shamelessly maligned.” 
YOLLAND 1906, 3–4. 
10  “Nor do these pages, when I look over them, seem fully to convey a sense of the 
delicious freshness and wildness of the scenery, with its magnificent rock-peaks 
rising out of its sombre forests; still less perhaps of the charm which the simple, 
free and easy Hungarian life, the frank and hearty manners of the people, have for 
anyone who can find himself in sympathy with them. Nowhere in the European 
continent does an Englishman feel himself more at home. After a few weeks 
among the Magyars one can enter into the spirit of the national adage—an adage 
which a late respected missionary (a staid old Scotsman, sent to Pesth by the Socie-
ty for the Conversion of the Jews) whose persistence in the duty he was charged 
with did not check his enjoyment of general society, is said to have been fond of 
repeating: "Extra Hungariam! non est vita, / Vel si quidem est, non est ita.” BRYCE 
1923, 139–140. 
11  BRYCE 1923, VIII–IX. 
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The Spectator, namely that the Hungarians treated the Slovaks tyrannically and 
wanted to oppress them.12 
Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson had a much more extensive network of 
relationships in Europe and thus had more significant impact on both the Eu-
ropean and British political and public discourse. Seton-Watson circulated 
propaganda films on the Serbs and distributed propaganda leaflets in British 
schools. In line with this, Steed participated at various conferences in France 
during which visits he deeply impressed French intellectuals and some politi-
cians. His French colleagues like Jules Chopin or Ernest Denis, got to know the 
activities of British propagandists, and subsequently acknowledged and sup-
ported them. French Slavophiles were contended that their British comrades 
bore witness to similar views.13 However, it is still unknown in what kind of 
relationship British and French Slavophils had and how they could precisely 
impact on the course of the Paris Peace Conference. Did Denis or Seton-Watson 
personally know each other? Did Edvard Beneš act as a mediator between 
them? Did they consult to unify and better present their views at the confer-
ence? 
Nonetheless, during the war, most of the British political perspective on 
Austria-Hungary rather turned to an anti-Hungarian stance due to the fact that 
anti-Hungarian propaganda in Great Britain operated far more effectively, 
unlike the pro-Hungarian one. In addition to this, the development of the mili-
tary affairs, especially with the approaching and more and more perspicuous 
exhaustion of the Central Powers in the last two years of the war, obviously 
favoured the position of anti-Hungarians, too. 
 
 
Hungary at the End of the Great War and the formation of British perspectives 
 
In December 1916 Lloyd George and his five-membered war cabinet replaced 
the Asquith administration. Arthur Balfour was elected as the new foreign 
secretary. The new cabinet considered the issue of a separate peace treaty with 
Austria-Hungary. Thus, they initiated negotiations, which took place in Gene-
va between General Jan Smuts and the ex-Austro-Hungarian ambassador, 
Count Albert von Mensdorff, in December 1917. Smuts offered England’s ad-
vocacy and goodwill for Mensdorff if the Monarchy disentangles itself from 
Germany and forms a new, liberal and federal state which gives franchise to 
 
12  The Spectator, November 2, 1907. URL: http://archive.spectator.co.uk/. (Access: 
29.06.2020). 
13  Jules Chopin: Bibliographie. La Nation Tchèque, August 15, 1916. (1916) 126. URL: 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/accueil/?mode=desktop. (Access: 29.06.2020); Pierre de Quiri-
elle: Un programme de M. H. Wickham Steed. La Nation Tchèque, May 15, 1916. 
(1916) 19-24. URL: http://gallica.bnf.fr/accueil/?mode=desktop. (Access: 
29.06.2020); Ernest Denis: Les Slovaques. La Nation Tcheque, December 1, 1916. 
(1916) 230-237. URL: http://gallica.bnf.fr/accueil/?mode=desktop. (Access: 
29.06.2020). 
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the nationalities. The British government argued that a federal Monarchy 
would resist a German expansion better than a dismembered Monarchy. In 
1918 Lloyd George made it clear that he had no intention to dismember the 
Monarchy, he only asked for democratic self-government for the nationalities. 
In March 1918, as their final answer to the British peace-proposal, Austrians 
chose to uphold the German alliance.14 
After the failure of the negotiations, the British government changed tactics. 
They entrusted the British press baron Lord Northcliffe to set up a propaganda 
team to attack enemy countries. Northcliffe appointed Steed and Seton-Watson 
as the heads of the team to contribute propaganda against Austria-Hungary. 
Therefore, they could now campaign with official support and increased pres-
tige for the Monarchy’s dismemberment and national ambitions for independ-
ence. Their strategy, suggested by Steed and Seton-Watson, “outlined a new 
policy, which included the breaking of Austria-Hungary’s power by support-
ing and encouragement of every anti-German and pro-Entente nation and ten-
dency”.15 This strategy aimed at raising nationalities against the Monarchy on 
the battlefields as well. Leaflets were distributed among the Austrian-
Hungarian forces, which propagated Czech and Yugoslav independence pro-
grams, advocated by the Entente governments, and presented new borderlines. 
These leaflets called the soldiers for deserting the army and they were also 
invited to join the Entente forces.16 
Seton-Watson and Steed established The New Europe, which was a journal 
that embraced different thinkers, politicians, historians and other influential 
people who were against Austria-Hungary and its two leading nations, espe-
cially against the Hungarians, and wanted to dismantle the Monarchy. The 
journal was first published in October 1916. What is more, it was a sound fo-
rum for the politicians of the nationalities of the Monarchy.17 
At the beginning of 1918, the Political Intelligence Department was estab-
lished in the Foreign Office. The majority of the members was from the circle of 
The New Europe, such as Seton-Watson, Steed, Alan Leeper (member of the 
Smuts mission, along with Eyre Crowe), Harold W. Temperley (British Histori-
an who later participated at the Paris Peace Conference). In addition, Seton-
Watson was appointed as the leader of the Austro-Hungarian division of the 
Department of Enemy Propaganda. Even if the British government was not 
directly responsible for the dismantling of Hungary, but it accelerated this 
process. Nonetheless, contemporary British leading politicians allowed minor 
pro-Slav, pro-Romanian and anti-Austria-Hungary political groups in the For-
eign Office and in the press to accomplish the rearrangement of East Central 
Europe.18 
 
14  JESZENSZKY 1994, 303–305. 
15  JESZENSZKY 1994, 306.; English translation by Erik Papp, see PAPP 2020. 
16  Ibid. 
17  MAGYARICS 2007, 3. 
18  MAGYARICS 2007, 5. 
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Consequently, it can be argued that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary can 
be explained by two major factors. On the one hand, the culmination of the 
nationalist tensions within the state can be considered as one of these. The in-
tensification of these tensions via the Entente Powers made the process of de-
cline irreversible on the other. The Entente Powers took part in dismantling the 
Monarchy by signing secret treaties, entering into agreements with their allies 
and by promises made to nationalist leaders. The defeat of the Monarchy at 
war put an end to this process.19 The newly founded Czechoslovak National 
Council was gradually accepted as the core of the future Czechoslovak gov-
ernment and then as an allied partner by the British government in September 
1918.20 Moreover, advocating the nationalities’ ambitions, which was also in 
accordance with President Wilson’s declaration, seemed a good remedy for the 
spread of Bolshevism. Also, it served as an answer to the charge of annexation. 
The Monarchy finally laid down arms in October 1918. 
One of the reasons that revolutions could appear was that the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy was dissolved: on the 16th of October, 1918, King Charles 
IV declared Austria a completely independent state from Hungary.21 The sepa-
ration from Austria was one of the very first issues that needed to be solved in 
order to have a chance at restoring Hungary after the First World War. After 
the separation, Hungary was also in need of a new constitutional framework, 
because at that point, it was a kingdom without a king. On the 16th of Novem-
ber, 1918, after the dethronement of Charles IV, the Hungarian National Coun-
cil was set up to establish the principles of the new democratic political sys-
tem.22 
Count Mihály Károlyi was elected as the president of the council, who in-
tended to finish the war immediately and to initiate constitutional and political 
reforms.23 The need for change was the reason that even the soldiers who just 
arrived home from the front lines demanded a revolutionary change, which in 
turn led to the events of the Aster Revolution.24 While it set out to be a revolt 
with guns, later it turned into a revolution and it gave the power into the 
hands of Károlyi and the National Council. Archduke Joseph of Austria, who 
was the regent of King Charles in Hungary, declared that Count Károlyi would 
be the Prime Minister of the country.25 
Károlyi still wanted to end the war, so he entered into negotiations with the 
leaders of the four great powers, France, Great Britain, the United States of 
America, and Italy, yet without success. As Bryan Cartledge emphasises, they 
 
19  ORMOS 1983, 13–14. 
20  JESZENSZKY 1994, 307. 
21  GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 14. 
22  Ibid. 
23  GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 14–15. 
24  On 30 October, 1918, the soldiers who were coming home from the front rose up 
against the old political system of Hungary. (GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 15–16.) 
25  CARTLEDGE 2009, 47.; The original title of the work: The Peace Conference of 1919–23 
and their Aftermath. 
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thought that Károlyi was unable to create and control a democratic country, as 
Hungary was never democratic, and just a few months ago it was part of Aus-
tria-Hungary as a semi-dependent unit.26 In the meantime, while Károlyi 
wished to secure his place as the sole leader of the country, another politician 
of the old elite, István Bethlen began to organise a political movement in oppo-
sition to Károlyi. Bethlen founded the Christian National Union Party 
(Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés Pártja), which aimed at establishing a political 
platform for anti-revolutionary and conservative forces in Hungary against 
Károlyi’s politics. Among others, the party’s programme detailed how to settle 
into the world after the dethronement of the king and how to deal with the 
consequences of the war, for instance, the impending peace treaty.27 
After the Vix memorandum was received on February 26, 1919,28 which 
meant that a 40–50 km long zone would become neutral in order to ensure that 
Hungary would not threaten Romania, Károlyi was forced to resign, because 
this neutral zone could not be rejected.29 Because of the fact that Károlyi could 
no longer fill in the position of the head of the country, as he could not approve 
any negotiation with the Romanian government, another party emerged to 
take control of Hungarian affairs. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party 
(HSDP) took over the governance of Hungary, led by Zsigmond Kunfi. After 
the HSDP and the Hungarian Party of Communists had united, Béla Kun was 
elected as the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. On March 21, 1919, they 
declared that Hungary became a dictatorship of the proletariat.30 However, this 
form of government was not accepted by the Entente, or the successor states 
like Romania. Moreover, the governments of Romania and Czechoslovakia 
endeavoured to undermine the Hungarian military and political situation to 
turn the international reception of Hungary in their favour. These attempts 
were often illegitimate, for example, the Romanian army marched all the way 
into the heart of the country, as far as Budapest during the Hungarian-
Romanian War of 1919.31 After this move, it was not clear if Hungary could be 
restored at all, because there were many internal issues that hindered the polit-
ical reconstruction of the country, including the question of who the new polit-
ical leader would be or what changes would ensue in the political system. 
Furthermore, Hungary was still in the period between the end of the war 
and the signing of a peace treaty, which meant that from a diplomatic perspec-
tive, the country was not considered as an independent one. Instead, this peri-
od was marred by political instability that is testified, besides the communist 
 
26  CARTLEDGE 2009, 52–53. 
27  CARTLEDGE 2009, 56–57. 
28  Fernand Vix was the appointed military leader in Hungary by the Entente powers, 
whose task was to supervise the Hungarian government, and its relationship with 
the Little Entente and Switzerland. It was also his assignment to make sure that 
Hungary kept to the conditions of the armistice. BÁNFFYNÉ et al. 2013, 18-19. 
29  GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 24–25. 
30  Ibid. 
31  GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 34. 
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dictatorship of the Kun regime, by the sheer number of governments (Károlyi, 
Berinkey, Friedrich, Huszár, Simonyi-Semadam).32 While these Hungarian 
governments did not serve long terms, as G. A. Finch, a contemporary Ameri-
can political scientist also observed, the short-term and instable governance 
was a considerable reason why the peace treaty could not be signed in 1919, 
because it hindered the peace talks as there was no stable political leader or 
body to negotiate with in favour of Hungary.33 While Hungary had to tackle 
with internal issues, including who would lead the country and what kind of 
political system should be established, in January 1919, after the armistices and 
the capitulations had been signed, the representatives of the Allied and Associ-
ated Belligerent Powers, as well as the Powers which had broken off diplomat-
ic relations with the Central Powers met to decide the fate of Germany and its 
allies. 
 
 
Diverging conceptions on the Hungarian borders within the British delegation 
 
Before discussing the standpoints of the British delegation, it is worth examin-
ing how junior officers and political activists could increase their influence on 
the work of the British delegation. The reports from Vienna and Budapest were 
processed by the Western Department in the Foreign Office.34 Until 1905, the 
documents were transmitted to the competent ministers or the heads of the 
department without comments. The documents, which were judged more im-
portant, were printed and circulated in the government and foreign diplomatic 
missions. After 1906, a new system was introduced, so lower ranked clerks 
were granted the right to comment on these documents, thus relieving the 
burden of the minister. In consequence, the opinion of the competent head of a 
certain department became more important than the report of the diplomat on 
venue.35 The reason for that was the increased amount of diplomatic docu-
ments and a new generation who wanted to reform the Foreign Office, as the 
existing system became obsolete, and the formerly proposed reforms were 
insufficient. 
However, these reforms in the structure and administration of the Foreign 
Office could bring about considerable changes in such a complex and delicate 
system of international relations at the turn of the century.36 Because of that, 
many formerly unknown employees in the Foreign Office, such as George R. 
Clerk, Harold Nicolson, and, to a decisive extent, Eyre Crow gained influence 
over the issues related to Hungary.37 None of them were pro-Hungarian. 
Crowe did not particularly like Hungarians. Romsics claims that “Crowe too 
 
32  GERGELY – PRITZ 1998, 23–41. 
33  FINCH 1919, 159. 
34  JESZENSZKY 1994, 88. 
35  Ibid. 
36  STEINER, 70–82. 
37  JESZENSZKY 1994, 89. 
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assessed the events [the Bolshevik Revolution in Hungary] as simple bribery 
and stamped as political ‘foolishness’ everything aimed at pacifying the brib-
ers”.38 Nicolson was rather indifferent towards Hungary in the beginning. He 
claimed after he had come back from a mission that the Bolsheviks in Hungary 
were not a serious threat.39 
The Entente did not have a plan, a definite conception about what should 
have replaced the Monarchy. However, a highly efficient, pro-Slav propaganda 
team, led by Steed and Seton-Watson at Crewe House, submitted a modifica-
tion of the peace treaties to the cabinet. Before this suggestion would have been 
accepted officially, Leopold Amery,40 a political secretary of the cabinet and 
one of Lloyd George’s advisors, had appealed to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
James Balfour in a memorandum, in which he emphasized that the procedure 
of the peace conference should be approached constructively and not from an 
anti-German point of view. Concentrating only on appeasing the ambitions of 
the Entente Allies would lead to apprehension, obscurity and to another war.41 
Amery emphasized that the realization of the suggested national states would 
be impossible and undesirable. It was impossible because there were no clear 
ethnic boundaries and it was also undesirable because the sole application of 
the nationalist principle would result in states economically incapable of exist-
ing. Instead, he suggested establishing a new Danube confederation, a super-
state which included German-Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and which would 
have contained not only Slovakia but Transylvania, Bácska and Bánát as well 
as Yugoslavia and perhaps Romania and Bulgaria.42 In such a community none 
of them would be independent but would have free scope to develop. Amery 
approved wartime propaganda and advocating the ambitions of nationalities 
as a necessary strategy for winning the war but these should be restrained at 
the final settlement in order to establish a supranational unity in Central– and 
South–Eastern Europe.43 
Though the protagonists of the Paris Conference agreed upon accepting 
President Wilson’s ideas, in fact they were hardly applied in practice. The 
standpoint of Woodrow Wilson was not that harsh as that of the Prime Minis-
ter of France. As President Wilson later stated, “considering that the Treaty of 
Trianon to which Hungary is a party was signed on June 4, 1920, and came into 
force according to the terms of its Article 364, but has not been ratified by the 
United States”.44 As the map below shows (Figure 1), President Wilson wanted 
 
38  ROMSICS 2002, 93. 
39  DOCTRILL – STEINER 1980, 76. 
40  In the autumn of 1918, the British peace delegation sat down to appoint the fron-
tiers of the new states. The most reasonable plan for Hungary was prepared by 
Leopold Amery, who was Hungarian on his mother’s side. ROMSICS 2005, 56. 
41  JESZENSZKY 1994, 309–310. 
42  ROMSICS 2005, 56–57. 
43  JESZENSZKY 1994, 311. 
44  Treaty Establishing Friendly Relations Between the United States and Hungary 
1922, 13. 
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to give what the delegation of Hungary wished to gain: those territories with 
Hungarian ethnic majority would have remained Hungarian territories. The 
American President did not want to punish Hungary as much as France, and 
that is why Wilson left the negotiations before signing the Trianon Peace Trea-
ty, leaving only two countries to make the decisions: Great Britain and France. 
President Wilson’s intentions were directly in opposition to these. According to 
the Wilsonian fourteen points, the US President wished to open a new era in 
Europe’s history, which would have promoted the liberalisation of the world. 
Unfortunately, President Wilson stayed away from the peacemaking because 
the US Senate was too divided to accept the conditions of the settlement. How-
ever, the treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary were finally signed on 
the 29th of August 1921 by U. Grant-Smith, Commissioner of the United States 
to Hungary, and Count Miklós Bánffy, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Beth-
len Government.45 
 
 
Figure 1: American Recommendations for the new Hungarian borders. Source: ROMSICS 
2002, 181. 
 
These points might be called guidelines rather than frames they should have 
worked between. As Harold Nicolson remarked, “[g]iven the atmosphere of 
the time, given the passions aroused in all democracies by four years of war, it 
would have been impossible even for supermen to devise a peace of modera-
tion and righteousness”.46 He was probably right on righteousness considering 
the emergence of World War II and the dissatisfaction of East-Central Europe-
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an nationalities up to the present. The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George, maintained a liberal attitude emphasizing righteousness. He came to 
the conference with the desire to make a long-lasting and just peace. However, 
David Lloyd George was not able to decide on the fate of the Hungarian terri-
tories and people until the end of the conference partly because the leaders of 
the other two decision-making countries, the United States and France, could 
not stand on the same side. 
The aim of the French Prime Minister, George Clemenceau, was clearer than 
Lloyd George’s: “Of the major Allies, the French were perhaps the best organ-
ised in planning ahead, mainly because they knew precisely what mattered to 
them and because their interests were not really global.”47 Gusztáv D. Kecskés 
claims that the change of official French foreign policy in favour of dismember-
ing the Monarch was rather due to the changing military situation, and less 
because of the active campaign of the French experts, emigrant politicians or 
the pressure of the public opinion.48 Notwithstanding this, it is still worth not-
ing that these experts and pressure groups had a considerable impact on the 
French delegation. Between Clemenceau and Wilson the British PM stood in 
the middle of the events: Lloyd George did not want to allow the Hungarian 
government to sign a simple peace treaty, but did not have as great plans as 
the French delegation had. He was one of those politicians who in the begin-
ning believed that Hungary needed to be punished for their war crimes, but 
eventually, he reconsidered the Hungarian case and tried to make a more ap-
pealing peace for Hungary. It is also an essential factor that Lloyd George often 
did not even listen to his advisors, mostly relied on the people who accompa-
nied him to the peace talks.49 Moreover, he occasionally did not even wish to 
listen to anyone: he wanted to create his own peace treaties.50 
David Lloyd George, who was against Hungary during most of the time 
turned to Wilson’s side, because he believed that if Croatia can be friendly 
towards Hungary apart from all the oppression they received as a part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, then the Allied powers also need to listen to the 
Hungarian delegation.51 As it has been mentioned above, when the Romanian 
army marched as far as Budapest, it was the turning point because the delega-
tions of Britain and France realized how unstable the political and military 
situation in Hungary was, and how the interference of the other countries 
proved to be harmful towards the Hungarian Peace Treaty. Lloyd George 
turned against Romania: according to him, it was only a chance for them to 
steal land using the opportunity that neither the Hungarian government, nor 
the Entente powers were able to predict how detrimental the outcome of the 
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Peace Conference could be.52 The Romanians eventually occupied even Buda-
pest, and with that they completely violated the agreement with the Entente. 
Eventually, Lloyd George and Clemenceau warned Romania and the countries 
which helped them, including Yugoslavia, to withdraw from Hungary, but 
still, it took quite a long time for the Romanian army to comply with this in 
March 1920. As Jan Smuts pointed out, “[w]hen the Hungarians and Romani-
ans some time ago made a forward movement, the Peace Conference laid 
down a line of demarcation which neither should cross. It was a military, not a 
political line […].”53 This was among the first conflicts that the decision-making 
countries had to solve in connection with the possible outcome of the confer-
ence. 
The British Prime Minister was among those politicians who decided the 
fate of the enemies of Britain and France. As the Prime Minister’s contempo-
rary, Jane A. Stewart, wrote, “David Lloyd George, the son of a Welsh school-
master’s son, was among the conspicuous figures at the Peace Conference in 
Paris, directing the work of winding up the triumphant closing of the great 
war”.54 Lloyd George’s opening speech for the Peace Conference shows that he 
was aware of the fact that these peace negotiations would not be easy, and it 
would be among the greatest challenges that he, as a politician had to make: 
 
I believe that in the debates of this Conference there will at first inevitably 
be delays, but I guarantee from my knowledge of M. Clemenceau that 
there will be no time wasted. That is indispensable. The world is thirsting 
for peace. Millions of men are waiting to return to their normal life, and 
they will not forgive us too long delays.55 
 
Even prior to the conference, one of the first steps that the Allied countries 
made after the First World War was to warn the Central Powers to withdraw 
all military forces from the invaded territories. The reparations had to be laid 
down, as well as the demilitarization of the Central Powers, mainly Austria-
Hungary and Germany. The British Prime Minister and Clemenceau first de-
cided not to admit Germany or any of its allies to the negotiations, which was 
unprecedented in European diplomacy. Traditionally, the defeated countries 
could speak for themselves, for their rights during the peace talks, but this time 
it was denied. In the case of the German peace treaty, the leaders of the peace 
negotiations did not allow any German leaders to participate at the conference, 
but for Hungary, they made an exception, mainly because it became clear that 
the Trianon Peace Treaty would cause great dispute even between France and 
Great Britain. While the Entente powers wanted to arrive at a decision about 
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the fate of Hungary, they were also reluctant to listen to the Hungarian politi-
cians and people. Despite this decision, the Hungarian delegation was eventu-
ally able to speak in front of the delegates of the Allied countries: this step also 
shed light on the difficulty of the process to get to the Hungarian peace treaty. 
The whole process of the conference was characterized by disorganization. 
No programme was given along which the peace talks should have proceeded. 
The sections of the British Delegation suffered from lack of coordination and 
accurate instructions in their work. Their inevitable improvisation resulted in 
not being able to come to terms with the parties involved. Instead of it, they 
had to spend precious time on the aggressive and definite claims of the smaller 
powers including the Greeks, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs. Moreo-
ver, German, Hungarian and Turkish delegates were not even invited. The ad 
hoc appointed territorial committees did not know that their recommendations 
would be final, though they had the opportunity to consult experts, including 
Seton Watson, but economists’ considerations, like John Maynard Keynes,56 
were not taken into account. As Harold Nicolson pointed out, this uncoordi-
nated redrafting of territory has disastrous consequences of territorial and 
population loss to Hungary: 
 
The main task of the Committees was not […] to recommend a general ter-
ritorial settlement, but to pronounce on the particular claims of certain 
States. This empirical and wholly adventitious method of appointment 
produced unfortunate results. The Committee on Rumanian Claims, for in-
stance, thought only in terms of Transylvania, the Committee on Czech 
claims concentrated upon the southern frontier of Slovakia. It was only too 
late that it was realized that these two entirely separate Committees had 
between them imposed upon Hungary a loss of territory and population 
which, when combined, was very serious indeed. Had the work been con-
centrated in the hands of a ’Hungarian’ Committee, not only would a wid-
er area of frontier been open for the give and take of discussion, but it 
would have been seen that the total cessions imposed placed more Mag-
yars under alien rule than was consonant with the doctrine of Self-
Determination.57 
 
During the peace negotiations, it was clear that the British delegation did not 
represent the same point of view. The members of the delegation were divided 
into two groups: representatives of the cabinet and the Foreign Office. Depend-
ing upon which group a representative belonged to, their opinion could differ, 
or even be the opposite. Since the Foreign Office was characterized by an anti-
Hungarian bias favouring a dismembered Monarchy, the members of the cabi-
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net favoured a reorganized Monarchy, and supported the idea of ‘holding the 
Magyars together’ when questions about the new frontiers occurred. 
After Charles IV’s disappointing agreement with Germany, different sug-
gestions on the new frontiers of the successor states were presented. From the 
British Foreign Office, Lewis Namier, who was in close contact with Masaryk 
and Beneš, expressed his opinion on Amery’s proposal for a Danubian confed-
eracy. Namier preferred the concept of forming nation states. He argued that 
creating a confederation is against the Danubian nationalities’ plan and that 
there was no reason to be concerned about the dysfunction of these nation 
states, but if tension occurred, the League of Nations would solve it. Namier 
envisaged a Romania together with the whole of Transylvania, and he took it 
for granted that Upper Hungary would be part of Slovakia.58 
Among the above mentioned suggestions, Seton-Watson’s proposal was al-
so discussed.59 By Harold Nicolson’s own account, he and Allen Leeper “never 
moved a yard without previous consultation with experts of the authority of 
Dr. Seton Watson”.60 His proposal consisted of the concept of forming nation 
states as well. He created his plan keeping the Czechoslovak, Romanian and 
Yugoslavian strategic and economic interests in view against the Hungarian 
ones. Nevertheless, this plan was more favourable for Hungary than that 
which was accepted by the Peace Conference finally. He separated some so-
called ‘grey zones’, which were inhabited mainly by Hungarians. Their affilia-
tion should have been decided on the basis of careful international examina-
tions (Figure 2).61 
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Figure 2: The ’grey zones’ according to R. Seton-Watson’s proposal. Source: ROMSICS 
2005, 59. 
 
The British peace-delegation’s official suggestion for the Hungarian borders 
(Figure 3) was basically the same as that of Seton-Watson, except for the ‘grey 
zones’. Compared with Seton-Watson’s proposal, Csallóköz remained in Hun-
gary, but in most cases, the British delegation decided in favour of the Slavs 
and Romanians, explaining their decision with economic reasons. This pro-
posal was signed by the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Eyre Crowe, the 
pro-Romanian Allen Leeper and the anti-Hungarian Harold Nicolson.62 
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Figure 3: British Boundary Recommendations. Source: ROMSICS 2002, 178. 
 
These planned border-lines became more unfavourable for Hungary, when 
accepting Beneš’ demand, the British experts placed Csallóköz under Czecho-
slovakian control. In addition, the railway line of Szatmárnémeti-Nagykároly-
Nagyvárad was given to Romania, and the Yugoslav-Hungarian borderline 
came to be traced along the Horgos-Kelebia-Kiskőszeg line so that Belgrade 
would be better protected.63 
In a 1915 memorandum to the British Foreign Office, Tomáš Masaryk 
brought up the idea of a corridor which would link Czechoslovakia with Yu-
goslavia. This 11,500 km2 large area, would have included the Hungarian coun-
ties of Pozsony, Sopron, Moson, and Vas. The northern part of this corridor 
would have been devoted to Czechoslovakia, and the southern part to Yugo-
slavia. Masaryk’s explanation for forming this territory was the union of the 
Slavs and hindering the reunion of Austria with Hungary. In this way the 
Czech state would have had a passage to the Adriatic Sea (Figure 4). 
 
63  ROMSICS 2005, 64. 
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Figure 4: Masaryk’s demand for the formation of a ‘Slav Corridor’. Source: PÁNDI 1997, 
373. 
 
However, Seton-Watson was against the idea of the corridor: “The claims to 
territory inhabited by Germans and to a corridor through western Hungary, 
though defensible on economic or strategic grounds, were clearly incompatible 
with the principle of national self-determination of which Masaryk was in gen-
eral a most eloquent spokesman.”64 The Great Powers rejected the idea on 8 
March of 1919, but one third of the territory of the corridor became Austrian 
land as Burgenland in August of 1919 though.65 This also showed the impact 
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political activists, like Seton-Watson, could exercise on the course of the peace 
conference. 
Lacking a separate committee which would have dealt with only the Hun-
garian borderlines, two other committees, that is, the Czecho-Slovak Territorial 
Committee and the Romanian-Yugoslav Committee, decided on Hungarian 
questions. Among the experts working here one could find Harold Nicolson as 
well. After hearing and studying the invited parties’ proposals, these commit-
tees made their own suggestions. These suggestions were generally accepted 
by the ‘Big Four’ or the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Romanian demands 
were submitted by Prime Minister Ion Brătianu. Ignác Romsics points out that 
the South Slav, Romanian and Czechoslovak demands were marked by a lack 
of restraint; their justifications were inconsistent and hypocritical. Brătianu laid 
his claim in accordance with the 1916 Bucharest Treaty. Romanian frontier 
suggestions extended southwest from Vásárosnamény towards Debrecen, then 
all the way down to the meeting of the Danube and the Tisza River.66 He con-
firmed his demands with false statistics which showed exaggerated figures as 
for the Romanian population and underestimated data as for the Hungarian 
one (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Czechoslovak, Romanian and South Slav Territorial Demands. Source: 
ROMSICS 2002, 184. 
 
The Czechoslovakian claims were presented by Prime Minister Karel Kra-
mář and Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš on 5th of February, 1919. Besides form-
ing the ‘Slavic Corridor’, connecting Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia, and the 
area of Csallóköz, Beneš also laid a claim on the territories lying north from the 
Pozsony-Vác-Miskolc-Ung line. In this respect David Lloyd George remarked 
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that Dr. Benes claimed territory inhabited by a preponderant majority of Mag-
yars and the only reason for that was that it was essential to the Slovak popula-
tion that they should have access to the Danube.67 Furthermore, Beneš an-
nounced that Czechoslovakia wished to constitute a federation with the Ru-
thenians.68 The Czech Foreign Secretary argued that before the Hungarian con-
quest, Pannonia used to be under Slovak domination. According to him, the 
Hungarians persecuted the Slovaks up to the mountains and suppressed them. 
His other reason for gaining Northern Hungarian territories was economic. 
Czechoslovakia needed an exit to the sea, which would assure a direct usage of 
the Danube, thus the Danube River as a borderline was essential. Additionally, 
they needed this territory by reason of the railway connections which could be 
found there, though, Beneš admitted that this area was mainly inhabited by 
Hungarians. Nevertheless, he reasoned with unreliable Hungarian statistics 
and the racially mixed population of the area.69 
The Yugoslav claims were divided into three sections in Southern Hungary 
(Figure 5). They argued that they needed these areas due to strategic reasons. 
The first section ran along the Maros River from Arad to the Tisza River. This 
line was considered a strategically appropriate line of defence. The second 
section was located between the Tisza and the Danube Rivers. This area would 
have allowed the Yugoslavs to defend the whole of Bácska in case of an attack 
from the north. The third section ran from the Danube up to the Italian border-
line following the Dráva River. This line was also considered a well defensible 
section against an assumable attack.70 
The more severe these frontiers became, the more Hungarian people were 
ordered under foreign rule. When it became obvious, Lloyd George expressed 
his objection to it. He predicted that there would never be peace in Europe if 
significant amount of Hungarian inhabitants came under other states’ rule. He 
suggested a humanistic approach when drawing borderlines, that is, every 
nation should be given its own motherland, which approach should precede 
every other strategic, economic or transport approaches.71 Lloyd George or-
dered Field Marshall Jan Smuts to make an attempt to alter the British delega-
tion’s border-suggestions. According to an article referring to the fact that Da-
vid Lloyd George wanted to keep an eye on Hungary even before the peace 
negotiations, “General Smuts is […] being sent to Budapest to inquire into the 
position and supply the Conference with first-hand information on the whole 
question”.72 
General Jan Christian Smuts became member of the War Cabinet in 1917. 
The fact that he was a foreigner (born in the Commonwealth in Southern Afri-
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ca) made him a good negotiator, he was fighting against the British in the Sec-
ond Boer War, and so he represented a different point of view that could be 
useful in the rapidly and radically changing political and military situation. 
David Lloyd George, Lord Milner (another member of the War Cabinet) and 
Smuts were considering Austria-Hungary’s separate peace attempts, but Smuts 
did not really sympathise with either the Austrians, of the Hungarians. How-
ever, the circle of David Lloyd George had an opportunist point of view; they 
accepted everything that would have stopped the war. After the Paris Peace 
Conference received the letter from Béla Kun, the Foreign Secretary of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic in which he stated he would gladly receive an En-
tente diplomatic mission, the British Prime Minister was thinking about send-
ing Smuts as the leader of this mission. In spite of the resistance of the Foreign 
Office and the French, the Peace Conference accepted the propositions of Lloyd 
George. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office managed to send their two represent-
atives Harold Nicolson and Allen Leeper, members of the Czechoslovak and 
Yugoslavian-Romanian Territorial Council.73 At the negotiation on 5 April 
1919, Kun committed an error, he demanded too much, and Smut interpreted it 
as the refusal of the British propositions, so the mission had ended. Notwith-
standing this fiasco, at the end of his visit, Smuts bent towards the offer that 
Kun proposed: summon the people of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and 
decided the fate of the borders with them, not with the exclusion of them.74 
Moreover, Smut did not evaluate his mission as unsuccessful, as on his way 
back to Paris, he stopped in Prague and Vienna, and the Czech President Ma-
saryk agreed on the necessity of summoning a Central European Economic 
Conference.75 He wrote in his final report that a second Smuts mission was 
planned, but it was cancelled due to the unlucky circumstances (reaching a 
critical point in the drafting of the German peace, illness of President Wood-
row Wilson).76 
The member of the Smuts mission, Nicholson gave voice to his unfavoura-
ble view on Hungarians in his memoires: 
 
“[…] Austria”, “Hungary”, “Bulgaria”, or “Turkey” were not in the fore-
front of our minds. It was the thought of new Serbia, the new Greece, the 
new Bohemia, the new Poland which made our hearts sing hymns at 
heaven’s gate. This angle of emotional approach is very significant. I be-
lieve it was a very general angle. It is one which will not be apparent 
from the documents in the case. It is one which presupposes a long and 
fervent study of “The New Europe”- a magazine then issued under the 
auspices of Dr. Ronald Burrows and Dr. Seton-Watson with the doctrines 
of which I was overwhelmingly imbued. Bias there was, and prejudice. 
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But they proceeded, not from any revengeful desire to subjugate and pe-
nalise our late enemies, but from a fervent aspiration to create and fortify 
the new nations whom we regarded, with maternal instinct, as the justifi-
cation of our sufferings and our victory. The Paris Peace Conference will 
never properly be understood unless this emotional impulse is empha-
sized at every stage[…] My feelings towards Hungary were less de-
tached. I confess that I regarded, and still regard, that Turanian tribe with 
acute distaste. Like their cousins the Turks, they had destroyed much and 
created nothing. Buda Pest was a false city devoid of any autochthonous 
reality. For centuries the Magyars had oppressed their subject nationali-
ties. The hour of liberation and of retribution was at hand.77 
 
He acknowledged that he himself and his colleagues were under the influence 
of The New Europe. He mentioned the name of Seton-Watson explicitly, which 
clearly showed his authority and influence on the British delegation. From this 
perspective, the Hungarians were ‘demonised’, and, in contrast, the countries 
and national aspirations The New Europe supported were excessively glorified, 
thus they made this political and rational decision as something heavenly and 
transcendental. He claimed that these emotions and decisions could only be 
understood in the context of the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, Nicol-
son claimed that Hungarians and their cousins, the Turks could not do any-
thing but simply destroy everything that was not true. In such a religious zeal, 
it is obvious that these ‘experts’ could not make rational verdicts, and they 
committed huge mistakes. He even admitted his bias, but did not evaluate it as 
something negative. 
The diplomatic mission of Sir George Russel Clerk is also important to be 
mention, as during the war, Clerk sympathised with the circle of The New Eu-
rope.78 After a prolonged negotiation with the Romanians in September 1919 to 
stop the Romanian military advancement in Hungarian territories, Clerk 
stopped at Budapest.79 During his short visit, he met people with various polit-
ical affiliations, such as Ernő Garami, social democrat leader, who made him 
conclude the Hungarian problems could only be solved if a stable and viable 
government would have come into existence, which was acknowledged by the 
Peace Conference instead of sending ultimatums.80 Clerk did not think that the 
Friedrich government relying on the gentries could fulfil this role, as they did 
not have large social support, and the Romanian were still advancing, thus 
making Hungary vulnerable to another Bolshevik or extreme right dictator-
ship.81 He redacted these principles in his memoranda written on 7 October. 
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The effect of this memorandum was that the Supreme Council of the Paris 
Peace Conference sent him on another mission to Budapest as their High Rep-
resentative. His major tasks were to enforce the Romanian retreat and to create 
a Hungarian government based on mutual agreement. On 23 October, he ar-
rived in Budapest, and commenced the negotiations on the next day. His nega-
tive attitude towards the Hungarian had gradually changed. He trusted Miklós 
Horthy despite the fact that the French observers regarded Horthy’s soldiers as 
adventurer who should have been disarmed. In addition, it must be remarked 
that the French were not worried about Hungarian democracy, but they feared 
the revenge of Szeged. Clerk’s positive opinion even convinced Eyre Crowe. 
With the help of Clerk, the Huszár government had been formed. On 1 De-
cember 1919, the Hungarian delegation had been invited by George Clemen-
ceau in the name of the Supreme Council that signalled the end of the Hungar-
ian crisis, and the end of exceptional Anglo-Hungarian relationship.82 Smuts, 
one of the leaders of this committee, at the end of his visit bent towards the 
offer that Kun proposed: summon the people of the Austro-Hungarian Monar-
chy and decided the fate of the borders with them, not with the exclusion of 
them.83 
Originally, both the diplomatic missions of Jan Smuts and Sir George Russel 
Clerk aimed at stabilising the Carpathian Basin after the Great War. The pro-
Hungarian political groups within the British delegation also supported these 
missions, nonetheless, Seton-Watson and Steed also had an impact on these 
missions as Harold Nicolson and Allen Leeper were members of the Smuts 
mission and maintained direct contact with the British Slavophil groups. Con-
trary to his earlier neutral position, Nicolson became unfairly critical towards 
Hungarians due to his false pretensions and excessive emotionality.84 
As a result of his negotiation with Masaryk, Csallóköz with 400-500 thou-
sand Magyars would have remained inside Hungary.85 This proposal, howev-
er, never got accepted on a higher level of discussion though, and on 12 May 
1919, the Council of Ten86 accepted the original British plan without any modi-
fication. In the disputes over borderlines to follow, Lloyd George stood up for 
Hungary for several times. On 10 June, he held the Czechs responsible for the 
Czech-Hungarian military conflict, who wanted to seize the northern Hungari-
an coal-fields and industry built upon it. Furthermore, on 12 June, he suggest-
ed that the Council of Four should hear the Hungarian delegates as well, be-
fore the new borderlines would be revealed.87 
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At the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, several British people of high 
rank disapproved the decisions made by the Peace Conference. The most sig-
nificant opponent was James Bryce,88 who criticized the Romanians for their 
armed aggression in Transylvania, and the Peace Conference for their not hear-
ing the Hungarian delegates at all. He reckoned Romania’s obtaining of the 
whole of Transylvania together with the Partium and Bánát outrageous, be-
cause this territory was inhabited by a significant proportion of Hungarian 
population.89 While advocates of the Hungarian affairs envisaged a future war 
due to unfair ethnic arrangements, the anti-Hungarian group referred to the 
guaranteed minority rights and hoped for a prosperous economic cooperation 
between the newly outlined states, including Hungary, but failed to take hostil-
ity between them into account. 
During the consultations in spring 1920, the disagreement between the Brit-
ish Foreign Office and Lloyd George on Hungarian matters was evident for 
everybody. Against their own Prime Minister, the British Foreign Office advo-
cated the French proposals with regard to the Hungarian frontiers. Except 
Nitti, nobody stood by Lloyd George, so the reconsideration of these frontier 
lines was not possible. Although on 5 May 1921, the Treaty of Trianon became 
ratified by the British Parliament as well, several members of the ruling elite90 
considered it deeply unjust and incompatible with the Wilsonian principles.91 
The Romanian conflict helped the Hungarians in one matter: though Hun-
gary was originally not entitled to express any opinion in this process, the 
guest Hungarian delegation obtained an opportunity to share their views after 
they received the draft of would-be conditions of the proposed peace.92 The 
Entente countries and their allies could use the Paris Peace Conference for two 
things: to punish and to reward.93 It meant that those who helped defeat Ger-
many and its allies would be rewarded, which sometimes became equal to why 
Hungary had to lose the territories with Hungarians living on it. Knowing that 
the Allied powers already decided what to do with the country, Hungarians at 
home had already set out to devise a study, edited by Count Pál Teleki, which 
detailed the demographic boundaries of Hungary. The aim of Teleki was to 
prove the plausibility of ethnic borders, so that no Hungarian people could 
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become the subject of another country, such as Romania.94 Count Albert Ap-
ponyi’s splendid speech had some influence, since both the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Curzon, and the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, urged new 
negotiations according to the Hungarian Notes.95 Because Georges Clemen-
ceau, the French Prime Minister still thought of Hungary as a non-reliable 
country, and he stated that he did not want to hear about the modifications, so 
Apponyi had to approach the problem of detaching territories from Hungary 
from another angle: the question of a referendum.96 During his speech, the 
Count highlighted that losing 2/3 of the territory and millions of Hungarian 
people would be unprecedented in the history of all peace treaties.97 Apponyi 
pointed out that the peace treaty Hungary had to receive was crueller than 
what any other defeated state had to accept. According to Lloyd George, Ap-
ponyi’s speech was really convincing, it spoke to the heart of the audience, and 
it was not full of simple data. The British Prime Minister even asked for the 
map that Apponyi attached to support his speech (Figure 6), which contained 
how the borders should be drawn in relation to the Hungarian-inhabited terri-
tories. Apponyi’s other claim was to call referenda, because it was a possibility 
according to the American President’s peace terms.98 
All of this was advocated by the Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti as 
well, but the French representatives, Alexandre Millerand, who replaced G. 
Clemenceau in his office, and Ambassador Philippe Berthelot, ardently rejected 
any alterations.99 Finally, the document to be signed was placed in front of the 
Hungarians without any alterations, since, according to the British representa-
tive, Sir Eyre Crowe’s opinion: 
 
When we come to face these ethnographical difficulties it makes a great 
difference whether they arise between the Roumanians and the Hungari-
ans who are our enemies, or between the Roumanians and the Serbs, who 
are our Allies. In the first case if it were found to be impossible to do justice 
 
94  CARTLEDGE 2009, 105–107. 
95  Hungary was given the opportunity to react to the prepared treaty. In these notes 
Hungary protested against the dismembering, the reparations clauses and espe-
cially the economic reasons which were emphasized more than the ethnic ones. 
Hungary demanded plebiscites in areas with mixed nationalities and were intend-
ed to be annexed by the neighbours. DOCKRILL – GOOLD 1981, 126. 
96  CARTLEDGE 2009, 112. 
97  ROMSICS 2000, 128. 
98  CARTLEDGE 2009, 112. 
99 In January 1920, a new cabinet was appointed in France. The concept of the new 
government differed from that of the old one. Millerand and Berthelot favoured 
the idea of the Monarchy’s reorganization instead of its dissolution. Nevertheless, 
the French security policy remained the same, and the Treaty of Trianon was con-
sidered as part of the reorganization of the East-Central European region in order 
to weaken Germany. ROMSICS 2005, 30–32. 
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to both sides, the balance must naturally be inclined towards our ally 
Roumania rather than towards our enemy Hungary.100 
 
Consequently, Hungary had to suffer these territorial losses not because of her 
punishment in the first place but because of appeasing the claims of the Roma-
nians and the Slavs. Since France was the leading force at this peace confer-
ence, it was essential for Clemenceau to adjudge as much as possible to 
France’s above mentioned allies. Clemenceau accepted the nationalities’ plans 
about hindering Bolshevism, or weakening Germany. 
 
Figure 6: Hungarian recommendation for the new borders. Source: ROMSICS 2002, 
186. 
 
Hungary tried its best to avoid what could not be avoided, but eventually, 
Clemenceau’s idea prevailed and Hungary lost more than two-third of its terri-
tory. The delegates of the Simonyi-Semadam government signed the Trianon 
Peace Treaty on the 4th of June, 1920.101 The country became the greatest casual-
ty of World War I, as the Trianon Treaty was much crueller than what Germa-
ny had to sign, mainly because of the demands of the countries that helped the 
Allied countries during the war. As Eduard Fueter stated, “Hungary formerly 
was composed of many different language units, among which the Magyars 
formed only the largest of the minorities. Now it has become entirely Magyar, 
 
100  LLOYD GEORGE 1938, 920. 
101  These delegates were Ágoston Bernát and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár. SZIDIROPULOSZ 
2003, 191. 
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excepting for the German components in the Western districts”.102 It is an im-
portant statement, because the leader of Great Britain was the one who was 
willing to listen to the Hungarian delegation’s reasons in order to avoid the 
dismemberment of whole country. As the map below shows (Figure 7), many 
nationalities lived within the borders of historic Hungary, but many people 
who were Hungarians had to live outside the borders after the Trianon Treaty 
which seemed to be disregarded by the conference. The day the Trianon Peace 
Treaty was signed, everything stopped in Hungary: the people and the ma-
chines as well, because they realized that this was the moment that would al-
ways have an effect on their lives.103 
Even during the Paris Peace Conference, it became obvious for the British 
Prime Minister, David Lloyd George that after Britain and France, forced this 
treaty on Hungary, there could not be real and long lasting peace in Europe. 
Lloyd George admitted that when they became aware of the fact that Hungary 
lost two-third of its previous territory, it was already too late: they could not 
change the content of the peace treaty. The outcome of the Trianon Treaty 
could not be predicted because this was the very first treaty that prescribed 
such tremendous changes and stipulations in the life of a whole nation. This is 
why Lord Rothermere decided to bring the spotlight to the Hungarian situa-
tion. According to him, there were not many British people who were aware of 
what happened during the Peace Conference, or after, not to mention the un-
derstanding of the Hungarian situation in 1920. His decision to stand up for 
the rightfulness of Hungarian revisionism created a considerable basis for the 
acts in Hungary. “However, three million Magyars were left outside the con-
tracted frontiers, a fact which Hungary neither forgave nor forgot as it blamed 
the peace treaty for all social and economic problems.”104 According to Lord 
Rothermere, the treaty could be best understood for the British people if they 
had imagined that the British people would have been divided among Germa-
ny, Russia and Turkey, because they were promised British land after the 
war.105 Because in the end, that was exactly what happened to Hungary: its 
territory was divided, and given to other countries with Hungarians living on 
those territories which made the Trianon Peace Treaty one of the cruellest deci-
sion in the history of peace treaties. 
 
 
102  FUETER 1921, 157–158. 
103  SZIDIROPULOSZ 2003, 191. 
104  MARKS 2003, 21. 
105  ROTHERMERE 1939, 13. 
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Figure 7: Nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Source: ROMSICS 2002, 182. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper has examined those political reasons which affected the British poli-
ticians and activists in shaping their views on the Hungarian post-war settle-
ment and the creation of the Trianon Peace Treaty. Maintaining the power 
balance in Europe was the main political interest of Great Britain. In order to 
reach this aim, the politicians’ main motivations at the peace settlement after 
the war were hindering German expansion towards the Balkans and Russian 
Bolshevism towards Europe, securing a long-lasting peace on the continent 
simultaneously. 
Participants at the Peace Conference were not on the same opinion regard-
ing the way that could have led to an enduring peace. Even within the British 
delegation, representatives of the Foreign Office opposed to that of the Cabinet. 
While the British Foreign Secretary advocated the Czech, Romanian, and Yu-
goslav claims, which meant reducing the territory of historical Hungary to its 
one-third, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, agreed with Wood-
row Wilson’s conception about self-determination. On several occasions, Lloyd 
George emphasized that the notion of self-determination should have been 
applied to the loser nations as well. Besides, he urged an invitation of the rep-
resentatives of the Hungarian government to the peace conference, but by the 
time Count Apponyi arrived in Paris, the new borders for Hungary had al-
ready been settled. 
Unlike Lloyd George, Grey’s attitude could be considered anti-German 
while he was in office until the end of 1916. He advocated all the proposals of 
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the later formed alliance of the Little Entente, because he saw Hungary’s weak-
ening as one of the guaranties of preventing German expansion. His intention 
coincided with Robert Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed’s views, who agitat-
ed for the Slav nationalities’ ambition of independence and the dismember-
ment of Austria-Hungary. The objective of their articles in The Times, The Spec-
tator and later The New Europe was to convince British people of the legitimacy 
of those ambitions. They also made reports and suggestions on Hungarian 
cases for the Foreign Office, according to which the officials could form their 
own standpoint. 
Although Lloyd George’s liberal attitude was favourable for Hungary, he 
did not receive enough advocacy and support during the discussions about the 
new Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav borders. President Wilson did not 
take part in the final negotiations, thus, he could not support Lloyd George in 
his opposition to the new borders. The Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti’s 
help did not prove to be sufficient either against the ardent representatives of 
the anti-German views, consequently, Hungary had to suffer the most severe 
conditions accepted by the conference. 
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